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You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to 
Watch Them:  Loan Screening and 
Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment 
 









We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer 
screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender 
offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan.  For the 
remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, 
the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first 
group and added for half those in the second.  We find large enforcement 
effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points 
from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening. 
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Economic theory assigns credit market failure a central role in explaining poverty 
and  underdevelopment.   Borrowing constraints reduce efficiency,  increase  in- 
equality and  can lead to poverty traps  (Banerjee  and  Newman, 1993; Galor  and 
Zeira,  1993).  Credit  rationing also appears to be empirically important. Making 
use of experimental or quasi-experimental supply shocks,  several  recent  papers 
estimate a large demand for additional credit  – for consumers (Karlan  and  Zin- 
man, 2010), microenterprises (Banerjee et al., 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2011) and 
small and medium enterprises (Banerjee and Duflo, 2004). These studies, coupled 
with a literature showing high returns to capital (e.g., De Mel et al. 2008), suggest 
that there may be important returns to relaxing borrowing constraints. 
So, the goal is clear, but how does one relax borrowing constraints? Informa- 
tion asymmetries, including ex-ante selection  and ex-post  incentive and enforce- 
ment  problems, are often invoked as the root causes  of borrowing constraints in 
theory (Stiglitz  and  Weiss, 1981) and practice  (Armendá riz et al. 2010). If this is 
indeed the  case,  contracts that  alleviate asymmetric information problems pro- 
vide one route  to greater  credit market efficiency. A widespread approach in this 
vein  is based  on the presumption that  a borrower ’s peers  can counter informa- 
tion  asymmetries by providing information or enforcement  that  is unavailable 
to (or more  costly  for) the  lender.   The peer-intermediation approach has  been 
fleshed  out  over  several  hundred years  of lending practice  and  can  be seen  in 
a range  of guises  including credit  cooperatives, credit  unions, rotating savings 
and  credit  associations, and microlenders such  as the Grameen Bank.  The peer 
approach has also been analyzed over several  decades of theoretical work  on op- 
timal mechanism design in the face of different asymmetric information problems 
(e.g., Varian  1990, Stiglitz 1990, Besley et al. 1993, Banerjee et al. 1994, Besley and 
Coate 1995, Ghatak 1999, Ghatak and Guinnane 1999, Rai and Sjö strö m 2004, and 
Bond and Rai 2008). 
Empirical work  on  peer  contracting mechanisms has  lagged  behind theory 
and  practice.  Empirical work  could  play an important role by showing whether 
and  how  peer  mechanisms actually alleviate asymmetric information problems. 






models are most descriptive, and hence most useful for policy analysis. Empirical 
results could also inform  practice, as lending institutions are actively  wrestling 
with the mechanism design question of how to implement peer mechanisms on a 
large scale (e.g. Giné and  Karlan  2010). But empirically identifying the different 
channels through which peer contracting might work– e.g., disentangling ex-ante 
screening  from ex-post monitoring, enforcement, incentives, or insurance – is dif- 
ficult.  The few existing  studies taking  this line of inquiry have  focused on sym- 
metric mechanism designs in which  individuals are jointly liable for each other, 
and have found mixed results. (See, e.g., Ferrara 2003, Ahlin and Townsend 2007, 
Karlan  2007, Gine et al. 2010, Fischer 2010, Giné  and  Karlan  2010 and  Attanasio 
et al. 2011). 
We designed a field experiment to test whether peers improve screening and/or 
enforcement  under an  individual liability  mechanism.1 This focus  allows  us 
to  address the  basic  questions of whether peers  have  information about  their 
friends and  whether they  can help  to enforce  loan  repayment, without needing 
to address the strategic interactions among multiple borrowers. Specifically,  we 
worked with  Opportunity Finance  South  Africa  (a member of the  Opportunity 
International microfinance network) to test  its Refer-A-Friend program, which 
offered  an  existing  client  (the  referrer)  a 100 Rand  ($12) bonus  for referring a 
“friend” (the referred, who  could  also be a family  member, associate, etc.)  who 
met particular criteria. 
Opportunity first randomly divided referrers into  one of two  ex-ante  incen- 
tives:  referrers in the ex-ante approval incentive group were  told  that  they  would 
receive the bonus  if the referred was approved for a loan.  Referrers  in the ex-ante 
repayment incentive group were told that  they  would receive  the bonus  if the re- 
ferred  repaid a loan on time.  The ex-ante repayment incentive referrers had both 
an ex-ante  incentive to refer  applicants of good  credit  quality (both observable 
and unobservable to Opportunity), and an ex-post  incentive to encourage repay- 
ment.  Referrers  in the  ex-ante  approval incentive group had  only  the  ex-ante 
incentive to refer applicants of good observable credit quality. 
 
1 See also Klonner  and  Rai (2010), which  finds  in a non-experimental setting  that  co-signers 








Subsequently, Opportunity randomly surprised some referrers, whose referred 
applications had  been  approved, with  an improvement to their  bonus  contract. 
2    Half of the  referrers with  the  ex-ante  repayment incentive were  given  their 
bonuses as soon  as the  loan  was  approved, thus  removing the  enforcement  in- 
centive.  Half of referrers given  the  ex-ante  approval incentive were  offered  an 
additional bonus  if the referred loan was repaid, thus creating  an enforcement in- 
centive. Thus, within each of the ex-ante groups half the referrers have an ex-post 
repayment incentive and half have an ex-post approval incentive. 
The design thus  produces four groups of referrers, each with  a different  com- 
bination of ex-ante  and  ex-post  incentives (in the  spirit  of Karlan  and  Zinman 
2009), that, under certain assumptions detailed below, enable us to identify whether: 
1. Opportunity induced referrers to screen on information unobservable to (or 
unused by) Opportunity. We estimate this by comparing repayment rates across 
ex-ante incentives holding the ex-post  incentive fixed.  We find no evidence that 
peer screening improved repayment. 
2. Opportunity induced referrers to help  enforce loan  contracts. We estimate 
this by comparing repayment rates across ex-post incentives, holding the ex-ante 
incentive constant. We find that  enforcement incentives do signficantly increase 
repayment: the small bonus  (100 Rand is equal  to about  2% of the average refer- 
rers  gross  monthly income  and  3% of the  average loan size),  decreased  default 
from around 20% to 10% in most specifications. The magnitude of improvement 
in repayment performance is far above and beyond what  referrers and borrowers 
could accomplish with side-contracting, and the improvement in collections (and 
savings in collection  costs) far exceeded the lender ’s outlays for bonuses. 
We discuss the conditions under which  our screening treatment allows  us to 
identify whether referrers have information that is unobservable and useful to the 
lender.  We lay out  a model  which  identifies the key assumptions necessary for 
this interpretation and  show  that  our  2 × 2 design, which  allows  us to estimate 
selection  and  enforcement  in two  different  ways,  allows  us to identify whether 
peers  have information even  in a setting  where  the  unobserved components of 
 
2 Lenders frequently contact  borrowers with  promotions in this  market and  our  cooperating 
lender continued with the program after the experiment. We, therefore, feel that the arrangement 







creditworthiness and responsiveness to incentives are correlated. This identifica- 
tion strategy is a key contribution of the paper and generates a test of the identifi-  
cation  assumptions in two-stage experiments that  aim to isolate  selection  effects 
(e.g., Karlan  and  Zinman 2009, Cohen  and Dupas 2010, Ashraf  et al. 2010 and 
Beaman  and Magruder 2009.) 
Although our  main  focus  is on testing  whether peers  have  information and 
can enforce, our experiment also demonstrates the usefulness of a novel contract 
design.  Referral  bonuses proved profitable for this  lender,  and  hence  may  be a 
useful  complement to or substitute for other  risk-sharing covenants like guaran- 
tors.3 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 introduces Op- 
portunity and the South  African  microloan market. Section 2 provides details  of 
the experiment. Section 3 outlines a simple  model  of the referrer ’s decision  pro- 
cess, highlighting the conditions under which  our experiment separately identi- 
fies enforcement and  selection.  Section 4 provides some summary statistics and 
discusses the integrity of the randomization. Section 5 provides our main results. 




2 Market and Lender Overview 
 
 
Our cooperating lender is a new entrant to the South African consumer microloan 
market. Opportunity Finance  South  Africa (Opportunity) is a for-profit,  wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Opportunity International, which  has  1.26 million  micro- 
loan  customers across  24 different countries. Opportunity operates in the  state 
of Kwazulu Natal,  South  Africa,  and  expanded from  one  branch  in Pietermar- 
itzburg to 5 branches across  the  state  during our  study period (February 2008 
through July 2009). Opportunity offers small, high-interest, uncollateralised debt 
with a fixed monthly repayment amount. Loans  made  during our study period 
 
3 Loans  co-signed by third  parties are common in many  developed countries and  help  those 
new to the credit market to leverage the assets of their co-signers (often family members) in order 
to build  credit.  But in many  developing country settings guarantees are less viable due to limited 







averaged around 3500R ($US400), with a modal (mean) duration of 9 (10) months, 
and  a modal (mean)  monthly percentage rate  of 5% (4.1%). There is a competi- 
tive market for these loans in Kwazulu Natal  (see Karlan  and  Zinman 2010 for a 
description of a different  lender in this market). 
Opportunity underwrites applications using  a combination of internal and 
external credit scores (South Africa has well-functioning credit  bureaus). A nec- 
essary  condition for  getting a loan  is a documented, steady, salaried job.  The 
loans  are not tied  to a specific purpose, but  borrowers are asked  the purpose of 
the loan and most report needing the money for paying school fees for their chil- 
dren, attending/organizing a funeral, or purchasing a durable. 
 
 
3 The Experiment 
 
 
From February 2008 through July 2009, Opportunity offered  each individual ap- 
proved for a loan the opportunity to participate in its new “Refer-A-Friend”program. 
Individuals could  participate in the program only once.  Referrers  received a re- 
ferral  card, which  they could  give to a friend  (the referred). The referred earned R40 
($US5) if she brought in the card and  was approved for a loan.  The referrer  could 
earn R100 ($US12)4 for referring someone who was subsequently approved 
for and/or repaid a loan, depending on the referrer ’s incentive contract. 
Opportunity first  randomly assigned referrers to one  of two  ex-ante  incen- 
tive contracts, corresponding to two  different  referral  cards.  Referrers  given  an 
ex-ante  approval incentive would be paid  only if the referred was approved for 
a loan.   Referrers  given  the ex-ante  repayment incentive would be paid  only  if 
the referred successfully repaid a loan.5  Figure  1 shows  examples of the referral 
cards, the top card was given  to referrers in the ex-ante approval group and  the 
bottom card to those in the ex-ante repayment group. 
Among the set of referrers whose  referred friends were approved for a loan, 
Opportunity  randomly selected  half to be surprised with  an ex-post  incentive 
 
4 The bonus for the referrer was initially R60 but was changed to R100 in July 2008 at the request 
of the lender.  The inclusion of this as a control makes  no difference in any of our results. 
5 Successful  repayment was defined as having no money  owing  on the date of maturity of the 
















































change.   Among referrers who  had  been  given  the  ex-ante  approval incentive, 
half were assigned to receive an additional ex-post  repayment incentive. Oppor- 
tunity phoned referrers in this group and  told them  that,  in addition to the R100 
approval bonus,  they would receive an additional R100 if the referred repaid the 
loan.  The other  half of referrers who  had  been given the approval incentive ex- 
ante were contacted by Opportunity and  reminded to pick up their R100 bonus.  
(Opportunity did  not provide any  new  information on the incentive contract to 
these referrers, but we wanted referrers in both  ex-post  arms  to receive  a phone 













































Among referrers who  had  been  given  the  ex-ante  repayment incentive, half 
of the referrers were assigned to have the ex-post  repayment incentive removed. 
Opportunity phoned referrers in this group, told  them  that  they  would be paid  
R100 now, instead of conditional on loan repayment, and explained that this was 
the extent  of the referrer ’s bonus  eligibility (e.g., that  the referrer  would not re- 
ceive an additional R100 if the loan was repaid). The other  half of referrers who 
had  been given  the repayment incentive ex-ante  were assigned to continue with 
an ex-post  repayment incentive. Opportunity phoned these  referrers with  a re- 
minder that they would receive a bonus  if the loan was repaid. 
Figure  2 summarizes the randomization and  the incentives that  the referrers 
face.  Intuitively, any effect of peer  screening can be identified by comparing the 
arms with  and without an ex-ante repayment incentive, holding constant the ex- 
post incentive. Similarly, any effect of peer enforcement can be identified by com- 
paring the arms  with  and  without an ex-post repayment incentive, holding con- 
stant the ex-ante incentive. 
 
 
4 Separate Identification of Selection and Enforcement 
 
 
In this section we discuss identification. Identifying enforcement effects using the 
ex-post randomization is straightforward, so we focus on a more difficult  prob- 
lem - clarifying the conditions under which  our experiment allows  us to answer 





currently used  by the lender in its screening process?”  To facilitate the discussion 
we consider a stylized model  of the  referral  and  enforcement decision.  Within 
the context  of this model,  we provide a definition of what  it means  for peers  to 
have  information that  is not used  by the lender and  argue  that,  so long as refer- 
rers know how susceptible their friends are to social pressure and have more than  
one friend  who would take out a loan, our experiment can tell us whether or not 
they have unobserved or unused information. 
 
 
4.1 A Simple Model of The Referral Decision 
 
We model  a situation in which  a referrer  has  N friends that  could  potentially be 
referred for a loan, and can encourage them to repay  their loans by putting effort 
e into  creating  social pressure.  Each potential referred is characterized by three 
parameters:  a repayment type  θ; a  malleability type  σ; and  an approval type 
γ.6  The repayment type and malleability type determine the probability that the 
referred will repay  a loan according to the function 
 




where a high θ indicates creditworthiness. The approval type is simply  the prob- 
ability  that  the referred will be approved for a loan,  which  is determined by in- 
formation observable to the lender. 
We assume that the referrer  has a subjective belief regarding his friend’s type, 
which we denote (θ̂, σ̂ , γ̂ ) and which may or may not be the same as the true type. 
In choosing whom to refer, referrers act on the basis of their subjective beliefs and 
assess (ex-ante – hence subscript a) utility  from referring a friend  of type (θ̂, γ̂ , σ̂ ) 
given effort e to be 
 
 
Ua (θ̂, γ̂ , σ̂ , e, A, R) = Aγ̂ + Rγ̂ 
 





where c is a strictly  increasing convex  function measuring the cost of effort,  A is 
an indicator variable taking  on value  1 if the referrer  is in the ex-ante  approval 
 







treatment and  R is a similar  indicator for being in the ex-ante repayment group.7 
After  approval we  assume that  referrers in the  ex-post  approval group choose 
e = 0 and referrers in the ex-post  repayment group choose e to maximize ex-post  
utility 
Up (θ̂, σ̂ , e) = π(θ̂, σ̂ , e) −  c(e). 
 
We denote the maximizer (i.e., optimal enforcement effort) e(σ̂ ).8 
Our  aim  is to try  to understand whether θ̂ contains information about  true 
creditworthiness (θ) that is not already captured by the lender ’s approval process, 
γ. We cannot address this question with  our experiment unless  we make further 
assumptions. In particular, if perceived malleability (σ̂ ) is completely erroneous 
and unrelated to σ (i.e. if referrers have entirely incorrect  beliefs about  malleabil- 
ity), then  referral  decisions can be based  entirely  on σ̂ and,  even  though the re- 
ferrer  may know  θ, our experiment will not be informative about  the amount of 
information held by the referrer.  We therefore assume: 
 
Assumption 1 (Identification Assumptions). Let N̂ 
demand a loan from the lender. We assume 






∝  σ – Referrers know how malleable their friends are; and 
 
has more than 1 element. 
 
 
Part 1 seems  reasonable and  we maintain it throughout although we are not 
able to test it. Part 2 is necessary because, given our setup, no information can be 
extracted if the referrer  only has one friend  that  is interested in a loan.  The im- 
portance of this assumption depends on why we wish to know  if the referrer  has 
information.  Many  potential contracts would use  rankings,  or choice  between 
peers, as a means  of extracting information.  This is, for example, true  of  the 
mechanism discussed in Ghatak (1999). For mechanisms of this type  it is irrele- 
vant if the referrer  has information about  θ if N̂ = 1 and  our experiment would 






7 We are implicitly normalizing the bonus  payment to a value  of 1, this is without loss. 







One can, however, think  of possible  contracts for which  this is not the case and 
our experimental design is less useful  in those contexts. 
We now turn  to a definition of what  it means  for the referrer  to have informa- 
tion not used by the lender: 
 
Definition 1 (Referrer has additional useful information). We say that a referrer has 
additional useful information for the lender if: 
 
1. θ̂1 > θ̂2 ⇒ θ1 > θ2; and 
 
2. θ̂ is not perfectly correlated with γ̂ . 
 
 
The first part  of the definition simply  states  that  the referrer ’s subjective be- 
lief about  her referred’s repayment is correlated with  reality.   The  second  part 
states  that  the referrer ’s perceived probability of the referred’s repayment is not 
perfectly correlated with  the referrer ’s perceived probability of the referred get- 
ting  approved – i.e., that  the referrer  believes  she has useful  information that  is 
not  captured by the lender ’s approval process.   Such a belief is plausible in the 
empirical context  here because  referrers plausibly have  good  information about 
the approval process.  Micro loans are common in the areas covered by our study, 
most referrers have received multiple loans in the recent past and/or are repaying 
a loan currently, and lenders do not differ greatly  in their underwriting criteria. 
We now  argue  that  given  Assumption 1, our  experiment allows  us to deter- 
mine  whether Definition 1 holds.  To do this we first assume (in Subsection 3.2) 
that enforcement effort, e is independent of repayment type  θ̂ (i.e. that  σ is inde- 
pendent of θ̂ implying that  e(σ) does not depend on repayment type)  and  argue 
that if N̂ has two or more elements and  θ̂ is not perfectly correlated with  γ̂ , then 
the θ̂ of those  in the ex-ante  repayment group will be higher than  in the ex-ante 
approval group. Consequently testing  whether the repayment rate in the ex-ante 
repayment group is higher than the ex-ante  approval group (controlling for e) is 
sufficient  to determine whether referrers have information that  could  be useful  
to the lender.  We then argue  (in Subsection ??) that even if σ is correlated with  θ̂, 
so that effort is not independent of θ, our 2 X 2 experimental design allows  us to 











In this subsection we illustrate that  it is possible  to extract  information from the 
referred even when  the probability of approval is correlated with  the probability 
of repayment, as perceived by the referred. We begin  by assuming that  referrers 
in the ex-ante repayment group refer a friend  in order  to maximize 
 




where e∗  is the optimal e (which  we have  assumed to be independent of σ). 
Re- ferrers in the ex-ante approval group, however, simply  choose the friend with 
the maximum γ̂  because  there  is no return to exerting social pressure to repay.  
The result  of these  decisions are illustrated in Figure  3. Panel  3a shows  the 
distribu- tion of characteristics θ̂ and  γ̂  if they are imperfectly correlated. Panel  
3b shows 
a possible  random sample from this set: a set N̂ of potential referreds. The point 
R shows  the characteristics of the friend  referred in the ex-ante  repayment treat- 
ment, and  A shows  the characteristics of a friend  referred in the ex-ante approval 
group. It should be clear that θ̂R ≥  θ̂A and that so long as θ̂ and γ̂ are not 
perfectly correlated then  this inequality will be strict for some  referrers. Panels  
3c and  3d show  the case when  θ̂ and  γ̂ are perfectly correlated. The 
characteristics of those in the approval and  repayment groups will be the same.  
Thus  if we determine that  the repayment rate  is not higher in the ex-ante  
repayment group, then  it is either the case that  either  part  1 or part  2 of 
definition 1 does  not hold,  and  we would conclude that the referrers have no 
more information than  the lender. 
 
 




In this section,  we no longer  assume that  e is independent of repayment type (θ̂) 
by allowing malleability (σ) to be correlated with  θ̂.  A priori, it is not  clear  in 
which direction the correlation would go.  One  intuition suggests that  there  is 

















(a) Imperfect Correlation of Types 
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A denotes a type chosen in the ex-ante approval group and R a type chosen in the ex-ante repay- 
ment  group. When there is perfect correlation between perceived repayment and approval types 
there  is no variation in the perceived repayment type  referred under the two treatments. How- 
ever, if there is less than  perfect correlation, it will always be the case that the individual referred 











- as a consequence we might  suppose σ(θh ) < σ(θl ) where θh  > θl . Social pres- 
sure might even  be counterproductive if high  repayment types  are intrinsically 
motivated and  external pressure crowds out  intrinsic motivation (e.g.  Gneezy 
and Rustichini 2000, Benabou  and Tirole 2003 & Besley and Ghatak 2005). A sec- 
ond  intuition, however, suggests that  high  types  will be those  that  are easiest  to 
motivate; e.g., they  already care the  most  about  diligently repaying and  hence 
will also care most about  how they are viewed by their peers.  We therefore might  
believe σ(θh ) > σ(θl ). 
These sorts  of correlations  make  identification of the  referrer ’s information 
difficult, because  repayment rates will be determined by a combination of repay-  
ment  type  θ and the optimal social pressure e(σ). If there is correlation between σ 
and  θ, pressure will  differ by type  meaning that  we  are not  making apples- to-
apples comparisons.  This  issue  arises  also in other  settings where  two  part 
experiments are used to separate selection.  For example, in the moral hazard and 
adverse selection  experiment of Karlan  and  Zinman (2009) typical formulations 
of adverse selection imply that high risk types put less effort into repayment, con- 
ditional on facing  the  same  contract.9   A direct  comparison of repayment rates 
conditional on  the  same  contract does  not,  therefore, identify what  is usually 
thought of as an agent’s “type” because  agents  of different  types are also putting 
in different  levels of effort. 
Despite these challenges, our experimental design can identify whether refer- 
rers have information about  θ regardless of the correlation between σ and  θ. For 
the  purposes of exposition we  assume that  there  are only  two  types  θl  and  θh 
where θl  < θh and that associated with  each of these types  is a (mean)  malleabil- 
ity level σl  and σh . We also assume that there is no correlation between referrers’  
subjective beliefs about  approval types  (γ̂ )and repayment types  (θ̂). The analysis 
of Subsection 3.2 assures  us that this assumption can be made without loss. Un- 
der these conditions we will be able to determine whether θ̂ is correlated with θ. 
Extending the discussion to more than  two types  is straightforward. 
Figure  4 shows  the  four  possible  correlations  between σ̂ and  θ in our  field 
experiment. Denoting (θR , σR ) and  (θA , σA ) as the types  referred in the ex-ante 
repayment and  approval groups respectively, our  analysis will be based  on two 
 






Figure  4: Identifying the Referrer Screening Effect 
 
 
































































(c) Low Type More Malleable   
Repayment 




































































D( A) = π(θR , σR , 0) −  π(θA , σA , 0); and 




the first of which is the difference in repayment rates across the ex-ante treatments 
conditional on being in the ex-post  approval group and the second  is conditional 
on being in the ex-post repayment group. 
Figure  4a shows  the most straightforward case: no correlation between θ and 
σ.  Given  our  assumptions, referrers in the ex-ante  repayment groups will refer 
the high type θh and D( A) = D(R) = 0.5(θh −  θl ). Note that both estimates of the 






malleability to social pressure are uncorrelated, then  loans  referred by referrers 
with  an ex-ante  repayment incentive will perform the same,  relative to those  re- 
ferred by referrers with an ex-ante approval incentive, regardless of the referrers’  
ex-post  incentive. Conversely, if we find that  D( A) = D(R) empirically, then we 
learn that θ and σ are correlated. 
Figure  4b illustrates the  implications for identification when  θ is positively 
correlated with σ – that is, when  high types are more malleable. In this case, θh is 
chosen  in the ex-ante repayment group but, as shown in the diagram, condition- 
ing on the ex-post  repayment incentive we make the comparison 
D(R) = π(θh , σh , 2) −  0.5(π(θl , σl , 1) + π(θh , σh , 2)) = 0.5
  
(θh −  θl ) + 2σh −  σl 
  
. Without knowledge of σh  and  σl  we are not able to identify the screening effect 
from this one comparison (i.e., in the absence  of an additional empirical test, one 
cannot  infer that D(R) > 0 implies  a screening effect). Fortunately we do have an 
additional empirical test. Conditioning on the ex-post  approval incentive gives 
 




Putting the two results together, if high  types  are more malleable, then  we have 
D(R) > D( A), with  D( A) identifying the screening effect. 
Figure  4c shows  the case in which  high  types  are less malleable, but it is still 
the case that the referrer  refers the high type in the ex-ante repayment group (i.e., 
π(θh , σh , e(σh )) −  c(e(σh )) > π(θl , σl , e(σl )) −  c(e(σl ))). Once again  the 
compari- son conditional on the ex-post repayment incentive is confounded by 
malleabil- ity: 
 
D(R) = π(θh , σh , 1) −  0.5(π(θl , σl , 2) + π(θh , σh , 1)) = 0.5
 






Indeed, the diagram suggests that one might  mistakenly infer a negative screen- 
ing effect from D(R) even when  the referrer  actually does some valuable screen- 









case (b), conditioning on the ex-post  approval incentive gives 
 
 




and we can again identify the selection  effect from D( A). Putting the two results 
together for case (c), we have D( A) > D(R), with D( A) identifying the screening 
effect. 
In the three cases so far D( A) identifies the screening effect.  Figure  4d helps  
illustrate that, in the fourth case, D(R) helps  identify the screening effect.  Sup- 
pose that high types  are less malleable and, in contrast to Case (c), π(θh , e(θh )) −  
c(e(θh ))  < π(θl , e(θl )) −  c(e(θl )); i.e., that  here,  the  difference  in malleability 
leads  referrers to choose  the  low  type  in the  ex-ante  repayment group.  As dis- 
cussed  above, this could happen if extrinsic  motivation (social pressure) crowds- 
out internal motivation (which may comprise some or all of θ). Regardless of the 
underlying mechanism(s), the ex-ante repayment group in Case (d) consists  en- 
tirely  of θl , while  the ex-ante  approval group is a combination of low  and  high 
types.  In this  case, estimating the  screening effect conditional on either ex-post 
incentive will give the incorrect  result: 
 
 
D(R) = π(θl , σl , 2) −  0.5(π(θl , σl , 2) + π(θh , σh , 0)) = 0.5
  
(θh −  θl ) + 2σl 
  
, and 




So D(R) is once  again  confounded by malleability, and  D( A) recovers exactly 
the negative of the true screening effect, if there is one. This possible  outcome of 
the model  is indicated by a negative screening effect as measured by D( A) and  
a larger  and  positive screening effect as indicated by D(R).  A negative D( A) 
is, therefore, consistent with  the model  presented and suggests that the referrers 
have information regarding σ and (at least indirectly) information about  θ. Only 
in the case that  D( A) and D(R) are both negative would we conclude that there 
is adverse screening from the lender ’s perspective. 








a. If D( A) = D(R) = x then 2x = θh −  θl . 
 
b. If D( A) < D(R) and D( A) ≥  0 then 2D( A) = θh −  θl . 
 
c. If D( A) > D(R) then 2D( A) = θh −  θl . 
 
d. If D( A) < D(R), D( A) < 0 and  D(R) > 0 then  − 2D( A) = θh −  θl .
10 
 
Finally,  if D( A) < 0 and D(R)  < 0 (a situation that  is not  possible  in our 
model)  we must  infer that θ̂ is either uncorrelated with θ or negatively correlated 
with  θ. Thus,  under the assumptions that  σ̂ = σ and  that  γ̂  is not perfectly cor- 
related with  θ̂, we  can identify the  selection  effect regardless  of the  correlation 
between σ and θ̂. 
Combining the two arguments of this section we conclude that if Assumption 
1 holds  then  our experiment allows  us to determine whether or not the referrers 






5.1 Summary  Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics of Opportunity borrowers over 
the period in which  the experiment was run. 
 
 
5.2 Integrity of the Randomization 
 
Opportunity handed out 4408 referral cards to borrowers approved for new loans 
during the study period. Table 2 presents regressions of treatment assignment on 
a range  of background characteristics of the  potential referrers. If the  random- 
ization  is valid,  we would expect baseline  characteristics to be uncorrelated with 
treatment. In all cases an F-test of the restriction that  the coefficients  are jointly 
 
10 In this case it is not clear that  the referrer  actually knows θ. As argued above  we believe  in 






Table 1: Demographic Variables of all Borrowers During Experiment 
 
 









Age 37.789 36.000 10.785 
High School Education 0.637 ‐ 0.481 
Disposable Income 1753 1265 1703 









Disposable income is income remaining after rent, debt repayments and recurring obligations. An 
individual has a high school education if they have matriculated or gone on to tertiary education. 
 
 
zero fails to reject at the usual  significance levels. Further, most individual coeffi- 
cients are not statistically different  from zero and  the total number of significant 
coefficients  is in line  with what  we  would expect  to see by chance.   Below  we 
also  show  that  our  results are robust to including controls  for referrer  baseline  
characteristics. 
Of the 4408 cards  that  were  handed out,  430 were  returned and  245 of these 
referred clients were approved for a loan.  The surprise nature of the second  ran- 
domization (i.e. the change  in ex-post  incentives) provides another opportunity 
to check the integrity of the experimental implementation. Because  the second-  
stage  assignments were not known to potential referrers ex-ante  (nor to Oppor- 
tunity staff members delivering referral  cards), baseline  characteristics of those 
referred and  approved for a loan should not differ within the ex-ante  treatment 
groups.11   To test  for balance  we  run regressions similar  to those  presented in 
 
11 Comparison across the ex-ante  incentive groups are, however, endogenous. That is, we can- 
not compare characteristics of those in the ex-ante approval groups to those in the ex-ante repay- 
ment  groups as part  of the experiment aims  to generate difference in these  characteristics.  We 
can run similar  regressions on those who were referred not conditioning on being approved. The 















Female   ‐0.006   0.008   0.005   ‐0.008 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Age   0.000   ‐0.001   0.000   0.000 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
High School Education   ‐0.027   0.027   ‐0.007   0.008 
(0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Salary Earner   ‐0.004   0.022   ‐0.016   ‐0.003 
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Disposable Income   ‐0.003   ‐0.006   0.010*   ‐0.001 
(Thousands of Rand)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Application Score   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ITC Score   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ITC Score Missing   0.072   0.039   ‐0.058   ‐0.053 
(0.109)  (0.109)  (0.109)  (0.110) 
Requested Amount   ‐0.001   0.004*  ‐0.004*   0.000 
(Thousands of Rand)  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)  (0.002) 
Requested Term   0.002  ‐0.004*   0.002   0.000 
(Months)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Government Worker   0.005   ‐0.002   0.022   ‐0.025 
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Cleaner/Builder/Miner   0.010   ‐0.006   0.007   ‐0.011 
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Security/Mining/Transport   0.021   ‐0.004   0.020   ‐0.037 
(0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Retail Worker   ‐0.002   0.008   0.003   ‐0.009 
(0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
IT/Financial Woker   0.010   ‐0.025   0.014   0.001 
(0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
Agriculture/Manufacturing   0.008  ‐0.005  0.027  ‐0.030 
‐0.029  ‐0.029  ‐0.029  ‐0.029 
Constant   0.189   0.224  0.273**   0.315* 
(0.118)  (0.118)   (0.119)  (0.120) 
F‐test of joint significance  0.560  0.930  0.810  0.440 
p‐value of F‐test  0.916  0.533  0.679  0.971 
N  4408  4408  4408  4408 
 
∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗   ⇒ p < 0.1. Each column represents a separate OLS regression where the LHS 
variable is 
 
assignment to the particular treatment. Education is a dummy variable taking  on value  1 if the referrer  has matriculated. 
Application score is an internal credit score. ITC score is external credit score. Salary monthly is a dummy variable taking  








Table 2 where  the outcome variable is being  assigned to the ex-post  repayment 
incentive. The first two columns of Table 3 shows  the results of the regressions. 
Within  the group given the ex-ante  approval incentive, the F-test shows  that the 
baseline  coefficients  do  not  significantly predict  assignment to treatment in the 
joint test. Among the individual tests, only one of the sixteen  variables is signifi- 
cant, which  is about  what  one would expect to happen by chance. 
Within  the  group given  the  ex-ante  repayment incentive, there  appears to 
be more  cause for concern  (Column 2).  A higher application score  (i.e., inter- 
nal credit score) significantly predicts assignment to the ex-post  approval group. 
Given  that  application score is a key measure of the  observed credit  quality of 
the applicant, this is troubling. It turns out  that Opportunity changed its appli-  
cation score in May 2009. Before this time, scores are out of 200, while  after they 
are out  of 800. Only  12 referred clients  from the ex-ante  repayment group were 
approved for loans after this point  and  9 were from the ex-post  approval group. 
This is not  out of line  with  what  we  would expect  from  random arrival times, 
but  does  create  a problem in testing  orthogonality.  Columns 3 and  4 of Table 3 
take two approaches. First, in Column 3 we leave out the application score. With 
application score not included, the p-value for the F-test of joint significance rises 
to 0.326 from 0.077 and we are more confident that the allocation is random. Sec- 
ond, in Column 4 we restrict the sample to prior to May 2009. This restriction also 
implies  that  the baseline  characteristics are no longer  significantly predictive of 
assignment. We gain further confidence by considering the impact  of ITC score 
on assignment. The ITC score is an externally provided credit score and is likely 
to be another good  predictor of credit worthiness and  it is never  predictive of 
treatment status. Overall  it seems that the randomization was succesful.  Regard-  
less, we show  below  that our results are not sensitive to including these baseline 
characteristics as controls.12 
 
12 We can only control  for these differences when  studying the enforcement question, when  we 















Table  3:  Testing  The Balance  of Referred  Characteristics Across  Ex-Post  Treat- 









Female   0.041   0.098   0.088   0.147 
(0.113)  (0.104)  (0.107)  (0.113) 
Age   0.001   0.003   0.004   0.002 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
High School Education   0.131   0.022   ‐0.005   ‐0.008 
(0.148)  (0.164)  (0.169)  (0.173) 
Salary Earner   0.029   ‐0.117   ‐0.086   ‐0.106 
(0.110)  (0.113)  (0.116)  (0.133) 
Disposable Income   0.034   0.028   0.037   0.023 
(Thousands of Rand)  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.069) 
Application Score   0.000  ‐0.001***  ‐   0.002 
(0.000)    (0.000)  ‐  (0.004) 
ITC Score   0.002   0.000   0.000   0.000 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
ITC Score Missing   1.197   ‐0.116   ‐0.276   ‐0.077 
(0.893)  (0.895)  (0.922)  (0.935) 
Requested Amount   0.010  ‐0.027*   ‐0.026   ‐0.020 
(Thousands of Rand)  (0.011)   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.021) 
Requested Term   ‐0.013   0.014   0.010   0.012 
(Months)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Government Worker   ‐0.389   0.103   0.023   0.115 
(0.266)  (0.257)  (0.264)  (0.273) 
Cleaner/Builder/Miner   ‐0.094   0.098   0.028   0.027 
(0.207)  (0.211)  (0.217)  (0.225) 
Security/Mining/Transport   ‐0.330   ‐0.321  ‐0.450*   ‐0.355 
(0.226)  (0.251)   (0.255)  (0.275) 
Retail Worker   ‐0.212   ‐0.105   ‐0.166   ‐0.129 
(0.203)  (0.220)  (0.226)  (0.231) 
IT/Financial Woker  ‐0.570**   0.495   0.445   0.427 
(0.279)  (0.533)  (0.550)  (0.562) 
Agriculture/Manufacturing  ‐0.222  ‐0.168  ‐0.214  ‐0.199 
‐0.187  ‐0.222  ‐0.229  ‐0.234 
Constant   ‐0.547   0.642   0.692   0.348 
(0.923)  (0.932)  (0.962)  (1.059) 
F‐test of joint significance  0.810  1.640  1.150  0.990 
p‐value of F‐test  0.669  0.077*  0.326  0.478 
N  123  120  120  108 
 
∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗   ⇒ p < 0.1. Each column represents a separate OLS regression where the LHS 
variable is 
 
assignment to the particular treatment. Education is a dummy variable taking  on value  1 if the referrer  has matriculated. 
Application score is an internal credit score. ITC score is external credit score. Salary monthly is a dummy variable taking  









We identify screening and  enforcement rates  by comparing the repayment per- 
formance of loans referred by referrers facing different  incentives. We have  four 
different  and complementary measures of repayment performance. Each proxies 
for the costs a lender bears when  borrowers don’t repay  (on time), without need- 
ing to impose additional assumptions on what  the lender ’s cost structure actu- 
ally is (since in our experience many  lenders lack precise data  on marginal costs 
of collections).  First, we have an indicator variable, for all 245 referred clients, of 
whether or not the borrower was charged penalty interest  for paying late at any 
time  during the  course  of the  loan.  Second,  we measure whether the  loan  was 
fully  repaid on the  date  of maturity for the  240 loans  that  have  reached matu- 
rity.13  Third, for those 240 loans we also calculate  the proportion of principal still 
owed at maturity date (this value is zero for loans repaid on time, and positive for 
loans  in arrears).   Fourth, Opportunity charges  off loans  deemed unrecoverable 
and has made  a chargeoff  decision  (yes or no) on all but one of the 240 loans that 
have reached maturity as of this writing.14 
Each panel  in Table 4 shows  the  mean  of these  four  loan  performance mea- 
sures, organized by treatment groups. It also shows the difference in means hold- 
ing either  the ex-ante  or ex-post  repayment fixed.  These differences are our key 
results. 
The ”Difference” row in the first two columns of each panel  in Table 4 shows  
an estimate of the enforcement effect that is created by a difference in the ex-post  
incentives.  So altogether the table  provides eight  estimates of the  enforcement 
effect (two for each measure of default). The point  estimate for each of the eight 
differences is negative, suggesting that  adding the ex-post repayment incentive 
decreases the  incidence of default.  In each  case  the  implied magnitude of the 
enforcement  effect is large;  e.g., an  11 percentage point  reduction in chargeoff 
likelihood, on a base of 16%. Five of the eight estimates are statistically significant 
from zero, despite our small sample. In all, the results suggest that small referral 
 
13 A loan that was rolled  over was considered to be repaid. 
















































































Table 4: Key Outcome Variables:  Mean Differences Across Treatment Groups 
 
 










































































































∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗    ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty  interest  is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in 
making an 
 
expected payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that  there is no probability that  it will be repaid. Standard 
errors  in parentheses and  p-values  in square  brackets. p-values  are for a χ2 -test  of the hypothesis that  the difference in 
differences is equal  to zero.  Ex-Ante  incentive is the incentive that  the referrer  faced  when  choosing a friend  to refer. 
Ex-Post incentive is the incentive that the referrer  faced after the loan had been approved. Approval implies  the loan had 














incentives create social pressure that lead to large reductions in default. 
The ”Diff” column in the first two rows of each panel in Table 4 shows an esti- 
mate  of the screening effect that  is created by moving from the ex-ante  approval 
incentive to the ex-ante repayment incentive. The point  estimate for each of the 
eight differences is statistically insignificant and  positive. So there is no evidence 
that small referral  incentives induce screening that reduces default. 
The bottom-right cell in each panel  of Table 4 estimates whether malleability 
is correlated with  repayment type,  by taking  the  difference-in-differences (DD) 
across the two different estimates of the referral  incentive effects on default rates. 
Recall from Section 3 that,  under Assumption 1, a zero estimate of the DD indi- 
cates that ex-post  malleability is uncorrelated with ex-ante  repayment type.  And 
indeed none  of the  four  estimates is significantly different  than  zero.   It bears 
emphasizing, however, that  these  are very  imprecisely estimated zeros:  each of 
the  four  confidence intervals includes economically large  correlations  between 
malleability and type. 
Under the assumption that malleability is uncorrelated with  repayment type, 
we can estimate the enforcement and selection  effects with greater  precision  with 
regressions that pool across all four treatment arms: 
 
yi  = α + β
1 en f orcei + β
2 selecti + ei 
 
where yi is one of the four measures of default, en f orcei is an indicator taking  on 
value 1 if client i was referred by someone with the ex-post  repayment incentive, 
and selecti is an indicator taking  on value  1 if the client was referred by a referrer  
with the ex-ante repayment incentive. Results from this regression (without con- 
trols) are presented in Table 5. For each of the four outcome measures we see a 
large and statistically significant reduction in default associated with the enforce- 
ment  incentive, and  a smaller  and  statistically insignificant increase  in default 
coming  from  the  selection  incentive.  These  results sharpen the  key  inferences 
from the means comparisons in Table 4: there  is a large enforcement effect, and 
no (or a perverse, as discussed below) selection  effect. 
Appendix A shows  that these  results are robust to various specifications that 



















Table 5: Pooled Impact of Selection and Enforcement Treatments on Key Outcome 



















Enforcement  ‐0.188***  ‐0.094*  ‐0.129**  ‐0.100** 
(0.061)  (0.049)   (0.054)   (0.042) 
 
Selection   0.067    0.039   0.050   0.040 
(0.060)  (0.047)  (0.052)  (0.041) 
 
Constant  0.419***  0.197***  0.196***  0.149*** 
(0.054)   (0.045)   (0.046)   (0.039) 
 




∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗    ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty  interest  is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in 
making an 
 
expected payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that  there is no probability that  it will be repaid. Standard 
errors  in parentheses. Ex-Ante incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced when  choosing a friend  to refer.  Ex-Post 
incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced after the loan had  been approved. Approval implies  the loan had  to be 



















6.1 Size  of the Enforcement Effect 
 
The enforcement  effects  we  see above  are very  strong,  reducing default by be- 
tween  9 and  19 percentage points  in Table 5. It is interesting to ask how  the size 
of the effect compares to the impact  of an incentive given directly to the borrower 
– rather than  to a peer.  We have  one bit of evidence from a similar  context.  Kar- 
lan and Zinman (2009) conducted a dynamic incentive experiment with a similar, 
although much  larger,  South African  lender in 2004. That intervention is some- 
what  different  in that  the dynamic incentive did  not come in the form  of a cash 
bonus,  but rather in the form of a reduced rate on a future loan.  On average, the 
dynamic incentive reduced the interest rate on a future loan by 3.85% and led to a 
roughly 2.5% point  increase in likelihood that the current loan was paid  on time. 
This result suggests that to have  a similar  impact  as our study, a direct incentive 
would need  to be very large - in the order  of a 12% reduction in the interest  rate 
(effectively making the interest rate on the next loan zero). This again suggets that 
at least part  of the enforcement effect in our experiment reflects  social pressure, 
rather than  simply  the transfer of cash from the referrer  to the borrower. 
 
 
7 Alternative Explanations 
 
 
In this section we discuss alternative interpretations of the results. 
 
 
7.1 Income  Effects 
 
In theory,  the enforcement effect could  be driven by side-payments from the re- 
ferrer  to referred that  produce an income  effect on loan  repayment.  In practice  
this channel seems implausible, for several reasons. First, the bonus  was not paid  
out until  after the loan was repaid, and  the borrowers in our  sample are liquid-  
ity constrained (as evidence by the  fact that  they are borrowing at high  rates). 
Second, even our smaller  point  estimates imply  default reductions that seem too 
large (about  R500 on the average loan) to be explained by a small increase in in- 
come (maximum R100). Third,  as discussed above,  the enforcement effects here 












The repayment rates in Table 4 consistently show that the highest default rates oc- 
cur for those clients that were in the ex-ante repayment group and were moved to 
the ex-post approval group. In this treatment group, Opportunity phoned the re- 
ferrer and told her that the bonus  would no longer  be paid  upon repayment. It is 
possible  that this signaled that the lender was not really interested in repayment. 
If this explanation is correct,  then  our estimate of selection  conditional on being 
in the ex-post approval group would be biased  in favor of showing no screening, 
while our  estimate of enforcement  conditional on the ex-ante  repayment incen- 
tive would be biased in favor  of finding an enforcement  effect.  There  are three 
reasons why  this  should not  be a  concern.   First,  even  if we ignore  these  two 
means of estimating the effects, the other comparisons support the conclusions of 
the paper.  Second,  as discussed above,  it is never  the case that  the difference-in- 
differences is statistically different  from zero, implying that  these potentially bi- 
ased estimates of selection and enforcement are not statistically different from the 
unbiased ones.  Third,  and  most  importantly, if the signaling story  were  correct 
we would anticipate that repayment rates for the referrer  would also be affected. 
The default rate  of the “signaled”, minus the  default rate  of the  “un-signaled” 
are − 0.060 ( p  = 0.414), − 0.030 ( p  = 0.473), − 0.019 ( p = 0.664) and  − 0.006 
( p = 0.895) for the four  default measures (interest,  balance  owing,  portion ow- 
ing  and  charged-off respectively) indicating that  the  data does  not  support the 
signaling story.  If anything the point  estimates suggest that  the “signaled” were 





Referrers that  were assigned to the ex-ante  repayment incentive were promised 
a bonus  that would not be paid  until  the referrer  repaid their  loans.  One might  
therefore expect fewer referrers to make a referral in this treatment group, and/or 







to and  effective  at enforcing loans).  Either  difference could,  in principle, create 
issues for the identification of screening effects.  In practice, such  issues  do  not 
loom large. First, the number of referred clients does not differ across the ex-ante 
treatment groups (99 in the ex-ante approval group v. 94 in the ex-ante repayment 
group  p  = 0.516).  Second,  if those  referring clients  in  the  ex-ante  repayment 
group  were  more  patient and  this  impacted on how  much  social pressure they 
placed  on their referreds then we would expect to see evidence for this in the size 
of the enforcement effect. As discussed above, there is no evidence for this. 
 
 
7.4 Interpretation of the Selection Effect 
 
The interpretation of the screening finding is open to several  caveats.  First, South 
Africa  has  a well  established credit  scoring  system, and  our  lender has  exten- 
sive experience with  its internal scoring  model  as well.  The extent  to which  our 
results would generalize to markets where lenders rely more heavily on ”soft” in- 
formation is uncertain. Second,  we do find some evidence consistent with  peers  
having information about credit worthiness: the lender ’s approval rate for clients 
off-the-street  is around 23%, but  for clients  referred through the Refer-A-Friend 
program the approval rate is around 55%. This observation is consistent with two 
interpretations: i) peers know which of their friends are creditworthy, but this in- 
formation duplicates information already held  by the lender;  and  ii) peers  have 
correlated credit  scores and,  because the referrers were all approved borrowers, 
their  peers  are more  likely  to be approved than  an  average client.   These  two 
possibilities make it hard to give a causal interpretation to the correlation. Third, 
peers can only be useful in screening borrowers if they have multiple friends who 
need a loan. If this is not the case then our results do not imply that peers have no 
information, but rather suggest that this is a market in which  peer information is 






We used  a novel  field experiment to separately assess whether peers  have  infor- 






to enforce loan repayment. The results show  that peers  are extremely effective in 
enforcing repayment, but have no more information than  the lender. 
Our findings have implications for the design of (micro)credit contracts, sug- 
gesting that  a referral  scheme  may be a cost-effective  complement or substitutes 
for mechanisms – like group lending – that  are designed to mitigate moral  haz- 
ard/limited enforcement  problems.  The  results also  suggest that  mechanisms 
that rely on selection  effects are unlikely to be effective in the study location. 
Our  analysis was  based  on a novel  “two-stage” randomization that  follows 
the basic methodology of Karlan and Zinman (2009). Unlike that experiment and 
others  like it, our experiment allows  for two  different  estimates of the selection  
effect.  We show  that  in our setting  this  feature  of the  experiment allows  us  to 
cleanly  identify selection  effects  even  when  enforcement  efforts  are correlated 
with  the “type” that  is selected.  We hope  that  this analysis of identification will 
be useful for the growing literature that uses multi-stage experiments (e.g. Cohen 
and Dupas 2010, Ashraf  et al. 2010, Beaman and Magruder 2009 and Chassang et 
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Rai, A.S. and T. Sjö strö m, “Is Grameen lending efficient?  Repayment incentives 
and  insurance in village  economies,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2004, 71 
(1), 217. 
 
Stiglitz,  J.E., “Peer monitoring and credit markets,” The World Bank Economic Re- 
view, 1990, 4 (3), 351. 
 
      and A. Weiss,  “Credit rationing in markets with  imperfect information,” The 
American economic review, 1981, 71 (3), 393–410. 
 
Varian, Hal, “Monitoring Agents  With Other  Agents,” Journal of Institutional  and 






A Robustness to Controls 
 
We now  check  whether the  results are robust to adding controls.   We start  by 
estimating the enforcement or screening effect separately using  equations of the 
form: 
yi  = αi + βTi + γXi + ei , (1) 
 
where yi  is again  a measure of default, Ti  is a dummy variable which  takes  on 
value 1 if i is “treated”, and  Xi is a set of controls  for either  referrer  or borrower 
baseline  characteristics (these sets of characteristics are highly  collinear).   When 
estimating the enforcement effect here, Ti  = 1 if the referrer was given the ex-post  
repayment incentive. We condition on the ex-ante  incentive by running regres- 
sions separately for the samples that received the ex-ante approval incentive (Ta- 
bles A.1 and A.2, Panel (a)) or the ex-ante repayment incentive (Panel (b)). When 
controlling for the referred’s application score we include a dummy variable for 
whether the  client  came  in after  the  change  in application score procedure and 
also interact that  term  with  the application score.  Tables A.1 and  A.2 show  that 
adding controls  does not alter the coefficients appreciably. 
To test for selection  effects we repeat the above  exercise  with  Ti  being an in- 
dicator for whether the referrer  was given  an ex-ante  repayment incentive. The 
results are reported in  Table A.3.  In Panel  (a) we restrict  the  sample to those 
given  the  ex-post  approval incentive and in Panel  (b) we restrict  the  sample to 
those given the ex-post repayment incentive. For these regressions we control for 
referrer  characteristics as the referred characteristics are endogenous. Again,  the 
results are robust to including controls. 
Finally, we again pool the data and assume that the enforcement and selection  
effects are independent of each other.  That is we run the regression 
 
yi  = α + β
1 en f orcei + β
2 selecti + β
3 Xi + ei 
 
where Xi  is a set of controls.   In this  case we can only  control  for referrer  char- 
acteristics as once  again  the  referred characteristics are endogenous.  Table  A.4 
contains the results,  which do not differ significantly from those  reported in Ta- 
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Table  A.1:  Enforcement Effects.   The  Impact of Ex-Post  Repayment Incentive 







































(0.097)   (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.068) 
Ex‐Post 
Repayment 
‐0.208*   ‐0.115  ‐0.157*  ‐0.128* 





Controls  All  All  All  All 
 




∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗    ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty  interest  is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in 
making an 
 
expected payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that  there is no probability that  it will be repaid. Standard 
errors  in parentheses. Ex-Ante incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced when  choosing a friend  to refer.  Ex-Post 
incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced after the loan had  been approved. Approval implies  the loan had  to be 
approved in order to earn the bonus  and repayment implies  the loan had to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls:  
Female, Age, Disposable Income,  Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score, ITC Score, Job Type, Requested Loan 
Amount, Requested Term,  Branch,  Application Month,  Application year.   All controls  are  for  referrer  


























Table  A.2:  Enforcement Effects.   The  Impact of Ex-Post  Repayment Incentive 
Within Ex-Ante Treatment Group:  OLS with Controls for Referred Characteristics 
 
 



































(0.034)  (0.045)  (0.039)  (0.046) 
Ex‐Post 
Repayment 
‐0.312**      ‐0.072*   ‐0.066  ‐0.098* 
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x‐post 
(0.069)  (0.058) (0.076) (0.054)proval
 
All All All All Controls 
 
125 121 121 121 N 
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∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗    ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty  interest  is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in 
making an 
 
expected payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that  there is no probability that  it will be repaid. Standard 
errors  in parentheses. Ex-Ante incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced when  choosing a friend  to refer.  Ex-Post 
incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced after the loan had  been approved. Approval implies  the loan had  to be 
approved in order to earn the bonus  and repayment implies  the loan had to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls:  
Female, Age, Disposable Income, Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score, Application Score Post May 2009, ITC 
Score, Job Type, Requested Loan Amount, Requested Term, Branch,  Application Month,  Application year.  All controls 


























Table A.3: Selection Effects. The Impact of Ex-Ante Repayment Incentive Within 
Ex-Post Treatment Group:  OLS with Controls 
 
 




























Ex‐Ante 0.046 0.046 0.035 0.027 Ex‐Ante 0.007 0.009 0.018 0.028
Repayment (0.041) (0.035) (0.041) (0.031) Repayment (0.100) (0.080) (0.075) (0.063)
 
Mean in 
0.389  0.206  0.186  0.155 
Mean in 
0.258  0.095  0.076  0.047
Ex‐Ante 
(0.064) 
Approval (0.054) (0.054) (0.047) 
Ex‐Ante 
Approval (0.054) (0.037) (0.039) (0.027)
 
All All All All Controls 
 
113 111 111 111 N 
Controls  All  All  All  All 
 





∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗    ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty  interest  is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in 
making an 
 
expected payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that  there is no probability that  it will be repaid. Standard 
errors  in parentheses. Ex-Ante incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced when  choosing a friend  to refer.  Ex-Post 
incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced after the loan had  been approved. Approval implies  the loan had  to be 
approved in order to earn the bonus  and repayment implies  the loan had to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls:  
Female,  Age, Disposable Income,  Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score, Job Type, Requested Loan Amount, 
Requested Term, Branch,  Application Month,  Application year.  All controls  are for referrer  characteristics. Categorical 

























Table A.4: Pooled  Impact of Selection  and  Enforcement Treatments on Key Out- 




















Enforcement  ‐0.168***    ‐0.117**  ‐0.130**  ‐0.109** 
(0.065)  (0.055)   (0.054)   (0.047) 
 
Selection   ‐0.009    0.021   0.018   0.032 













Controls  All  All  All  All 
 





∗ ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗  ⇒ p < 0.05, ∗    ⇒ p < 0.1. Penalty  interest  is charged by the lender if a borrower is late in 
making an 
 
expected payment. A loan is charged off if the lender deems that  there is no probability that  it will be repaid. Standard 
errors  in parentheses. Ex-Ante incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced when  choosing a friend  to refer.  Ex-Post 
incentive is the incentive that  the referrer faced after the loan had  been approved. Approval implies  the loan had  to be 
approved in order to earn the bonus  and repayment implies  the loan had to be repaid in order to earn the bonus. Controls:  
Female, Age, Disposable Income,  Salary Occurrence, Education, Application Score, ITC score, Job Type, Requested Loan 
Amount, Requested Term,  Branch,  Application Month,  Application year.   All controls  are  for  referrer  
characteristics. Categorical variables are entered as fixed effects. 
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